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ESSAY
THE DISTORTIONARY EFFECT OF EVIDENCE
ON PRIMARY BEHAVIOR*
Gideon Parchomovsky* and Alex Stein***
In this Essay, we analyze how evidentiary concerns dominate actors' behavior Our
findings offer an important refinement to the conventional wisdom in law and economics
literature, which assumes that legal rules can always be fashioned to achieve socially
optimal outcomes. We show that evidentiary motivations will often lead actors to engage
in socially suboptimal behavior when doing so is likely to increase their chances of
prevailing in court. Because adjudicators must base decisions on observable and
verifiable information - or, in short, evidence - rational actors will always strive to
generate evidence that can later be presented in court and will increase their chances of
winning the case regardless of the cost they impose on third parties and society at large.
Accordingly, doctors and medical institutions will often refer patients to undertake
unnecessary and even harmful examinations just to create a record demonstrating that
the doctors or medical institutions went beyond the call of duty in treating them.
Owners of land and intellectual property may let harmful activities continue much
longer than necessary just to gather stronger evidence concerning the harms they suffer.
And even the police will often choose to allow offenders to carry out crimes in order to
improve the chance of a conviction. The effect we identify is pervasive. It can be found
in virtually all areas of the law. Furthermore, there is no easy way to eliminate or
correct it. However, the evidentiary phenomenon we discuss also has positive side
effects: it reduces adjudication costs for judges and juries and improves the accuracy of
court processes. In some cases, these improvements will exceed the social cost of
suboptimal behavior In other contexts, however, the social cost will far outweigh the
benefit.
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INTRODUCTION
Andy is driving on a narrow and winding road without shoulders.
All of a sudden, a car driven by Bob approaches from the opposite di-
rection. Bob, preoccupied with his cell phone, inadvertently crosses
the dividing yellow line and enters Andy's lane at a slow speed. Andy
notices Bob, but it is too late for him to draw Bob's attention. At this
point, Andy faces two options: he can either swerve sharply into a
ditch on his right or let Bob's car crash into his at a speed of twenty
miles per hour. Andy estimates the expected cost of each of the op-
tions he faces. Driving his car into the ditch will result in damage of
$iooo to his car. Staying where he is and letting Bob's car crash into
his will cause Andy's car damage of $3000 and Bob's car damage of
$4000. Due to Bob's car's low speed, no danger is posed to either
driver's bodily integrity.
Which option should Andy choose? According to standard law and
economics, the answer is obvious: Andy must swerve to the right and
avert collision. Under this option, at a cost of $iooo to himself, Andy
can save both parties the much greater expense of $7000 ($3000 to
himself and $4000 to Bob). Swerving is the least-cost solution in this
case. It is clearly the socially desirable behavior as well. Yet, if Andy
is a rational actor,' he will choose to let Bob's car collide with his.
How come? The reason is simple. If Andy swerves to the right, it
will be almost impossible for him to prove that Bob caused the result-
ing damage to his car. Proving Bob's negligence in court is going to be
a nearly impossible task as well. In fact, chances are that Andy may
not even be able to identify Bob's car or find its whereabouts after
their chance encounter. Even if Bob stops, moreover, he may deny his
responsibility for the accident - in good or bad faith - and challenge
Andy's version of the events. Choosing the collision option improves
Andy's fortunes quite dramatically. True, he will incur a greater harm
(as will Bob), but he will have a very easy time proving Bob's liability
in court. Allowing the collision negates the chance that Bob will be
able to drive away. Moreover, it produces incontrovertible evidence
regarding Bob's liability. The police officer who will arrive at the ac-
cident scene will immediately see that Bob entered the opposite side of
the road and crashed into Andy's car. The collision option, therefore,
guarantees Andy full recovery for his harm.2 Alas, it does so at a sig-
1 We assume that Andy is rational in a rudimentary sense, that is, that he is disposed "to
choose, consciously or unconsciously, an apt means to whatever ends [he] happens to have."
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (6th ed. 2003).
2 Arguably, Andy's primal instinct will prompt him to avoid the collision. Assume that Andy
follows this instinct: he drives his car into the ditch and suffers an uncompensated damage of
$iooo. Will Andy follow this instinct if he finds himself in a similar situation once again? Most
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nificant and socially unnecessary cost to both Bob and Andy. The col-
lision option is socially inferior to the alternative, but Andy, as a self-
interest maximizer, will still choose it since it clearly offers him the
highest expected payoff.3
This case is by no means a peculiar example. Consider Clara, the
owner of a summer home in the Pacific Northwest. A new chemical
plant starts operating in the vicinity of Clara's property. The plant
emits fumes and gases that damage Clara's property but pose no dan-
ger to her health. In principle, Clara can bring a nuisance action
against the plant and seek injunctive relief - temporary or perma-
nent. However, if she is rational, she will not do so right away. In-
stead, she will bide her time and let the harmful effects accumulate.
Specifically, she would do well to wait until the paint on the exterior of
her house begins to fade or even peel off and the plants in her front
lawn wither. Although these harms could be avoided and the socially
optimal outcome achieved if Clara took swift legal action, allowing the
harms to transpire is the right decision from Clara's point of view as it
will make her day in court a lot easier. Without actual proof of harm,
Clara may not secure her desired remedy. With it, Clara is much more
likely to prevail. 4
The same effect is present in our criminal law. Imagine that detec-
tives from the New York Police Department receive information about
a burglary of a jewelry store in midtown Manhattan. Detectives rush
to the scene. They assume positions around the store and watch the
suspect arrive. They can arrest him before he attempts to break the
lock. But they will not. Instead, in all likelihood, they will let the
suspect enter the property and perhaps even ransack the showcases or
break the safe lock before they actually arrest him. Acting premature-
ly will jeopardize their case in court.5  Catching the burglar red-
likely not: Andy's primal instinct will be superseded by his experience-based rationality. See gen-
erally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY § 1.2.5, at 23-29 (1991) (explain-
ing the evolutionary basis of rational choice).
3 Andy's choice does not constitute comparative negligence, nor will it allow Bob to success-
fully invoke the "avoidable consequence" defense. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
4 Here and in many other contexts, the distortion engendered by evidence-seeking behavior
may be partly offset by the saving of the party's expenditures on alternative evidence. We thank
Steven Shavell for drawing our attention to this mitigating factor.
5 This example is modeled on a landmark criminal case, People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888 (N.Y.
1927), featuring an armed robbery suspect arrested by the police while he and his accomplices
were searching for the man they conspired to rob. The suspect was initially found guilty of at-
tempted robbery, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed his conviction because the prose-
cution failed to establish that "in all reasonable probability the crime itself would have been
committed, but for timely interference." Id. at 889. At the outset of this decision the court stated:
The police of the city of New York did excellent work in this case by preventing the
commission of a serious crime. It is a great satisfaction to realize that we have such
wide-awake guardians of our peace. Whether or not the steps which the defendant had
[VOL.124:518520
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handed will get them satisfaction and good publicity, albeit at a con-
siderable cost to the store owner.
Similar examples pervade our legal system. As we will show, they
exist in a diverse range of legal fields, such as property law, patent law,
tort law, criminal law, and quite likely in all others. The diverse legal
fields all share one basic commonality: evidentiary concerns cause a
misalignment between the socially desirable behavior and a rational
actor's self-interested behavior. This misalignment, or distortion, is
fundamental and systematic. Furthermore, its implications for under-
standing the functioning of the law are significant. It suggests that the
rules of primary behavior that exist in different areas of substantive
law cannot on their own provide precise incentives to rational actors.
Rather, rational actors will always interpret the dictates of our sub-
stantive law through an evidentiary gloss, which in many cases will
prompt actors to deviate from the outcome envisioned by efficiency-
minded legislatures and courts.
The effect we identify in this Essay cannot be easily eliminated.
Nor can it be corrected. If factfinders were omniscient, this distortion
would disappear, but as long as they are not and decisions about liabil-
ity must be based on observable and verifiable facts, the effect will
persist. There is no ready way to align a person's quest to obtain fa-
vorable evidence with society's interest that each person act efficiently,
rather than wastefully or in a downright harmful way. In fact, the two
interests are fundamentally incompatible.
The source of the problem may be traced back to the different
theories that animate behavior-guiding and evidentiary rules. Be-
havior-guiding rules aim at protecting and improving society's well-
being, and regulate individuals' activities in accordance with these
goals. Evidentiary rules perform an altogether different function: their
role is to determine what constitutes proof of the facts upon which
courts should recognize individuals' liabilities and rights. Those rules
consequently create an evidence-seeking incentive that affects persons'
choices among different courses of action. A person interested in pre-
vailing in court will tend to act in a way that maximizes the probabil-
ity of achieving that result.6 This conduct will often come at the
taken up to the time of his arrest amounted to the commission of a crime, as defined by
our law, is, however, another matter.
Id. at 888.
6 By the same token, a wrongdoer seeking to avoid detection and liability will try to destroy
or suppress inculpatory evidence and fabricate exculpatory evidence. For analyses of complex
enforcement problems engendered by detection avoidance, see Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 842-43 (1994) (arguing
that firms' strict liability for employees' crimes may suppress the firms' willingness to self-police
and uncover inculpatory evidence); Arun S. Malik, Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforce-
ment, 2 1 RAND J. EcON. 341 (199o); Jacob Nussim & Avraham D. Tabbach, Controlling Avoid-
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expense of a socially beneficial action that the evidence-seeker will
abandon.
Let us return to the example of the accident between Andy and
Bob. Andy's motivation in allowing the collision is profoundly ineffi-
cient and, perhaps, morally objectionable as well, but there is no way
to avoid it. Ex ante, both drivers would be happy to make an agree-
ment obligating Andy to swerve into the ditch and Bob to pay for the
damage to Andy's car. Unfortunately, the two drivers cannot negotiate
ex ante. They can only start negotiating after the accident, but at that
ex post stage, Andy has already taken action to produce the evidence
most favorable to his case and thereby foreclosed the possibility of
reaching the outcome both drivers would have chosen ex ante.
Although behavior-guiding rules and evidentiary rules advance dif-
ferent instrumental goals, they operate simultaneously on real-world
actors. And if the actor is rational, the evidentiary motivation will
dominate. Except in cases in which the best evidence an actor can
produce does not suffice for a legal victory, a rational actor should not
care about the size of the damage (unless it happens to be a physical
injury that she wants to avoid at all costs).' She will take the course of
action that generates the most favorable evidence for her case - that
is, the evidence that maximizes her chances to recover compensation
for her harm from the other person.
Our main insight has far-reaching implications for economic analy-
sis of law and legal theory in general. Whether a person will have evi-
dence identifying the wrongdoer who caused her damage depends on
empirical facts. Those empirical facts do not correlate with incentives
for socially responsible behavior. Such incentives do not promise fa-
vorable evidence to a person who acts responsibly, nor do they deny
such evidence to a person who acts in a socially irresponsible way.
ance: Ex Ante Regulation Versus Ex Post Punishment, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 45 (2008); Chris Wil-
liam Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331 (2oo6); and Chris William Sanchi-
rico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DuKE L.J. 1215 (2004). For analysis of evidence fabrication, see
Chris William Sanchirico & George Tiantis, Evidentiary Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence
and the Verfiability of Contract Peiformance, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 72 (2008); George G. Trian-
tis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C.
Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. ro65, 1076-78 (2002) (arguing that rigid contractual terms may incentiv-
ize a contracting party to manufacture evidence that will fend off allegations of breach and that
vague contractual terms can mitigate this inefficiency). Fraudulent detection avoidance and evi-
dence fabrication fundamentally differ from the evidence-generating behavior focused upon by
this Essay. First and most importantly, we focus upon behavior that generates true evidence
rather than upon frauds aiming to distort factfinders' decisions. Unlike evidentiary frauds, such
behavior does not constitute a crime or a civil wrong. Moreover, there is no general way to set up
incentives against evidence-generating behavior. See infra pP. 527-29.
7 The socially beneficial motivation to minimize the damage will also dominate when the ac-
tor estimates that she is unlikely to recover compensation due to the wrongdoer's insolvency.
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The epistemology of causation is agnostic as to who did the right thing
and who acted wrongly from an economic or moral perspective.
Evidence specialists and law and economics experts have paid vir-
tually no attention to this problem.8  Extant scholarship has focused
exclusively upon the cost of evidentiary processes and the challenges
such cost presents to law enforcement.9 Accordingly, the principal pol-
icy recommendations one finds in the literature include cutting the
costs of discovery and proof;' 0 eliminating suits that require costly
fact-finding;1 replacing expensive factual inquiries by decisional
shortcuts,12 proxies,' 3 and credible signals;14 and introducing penalty
multipliers that intensify deterrence in areas where law is insufficiently
enforced due to the high cost of evidence.15  The existing scholarship is
8 For a related point made in connection with whistleblowing, see William E. Kovacic, Whis-
tieblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1799, 1829 (1996) ("Rather than promptly bringing problems to management's attention,
employees may allow them to persist - thus increasing the size of the injury and the relator's
potential recovery - and to gather evidence for pursuing a qui tam suit. The incentive to delay
will be greatest where few people know of the misconduct, and thus the number of potential
competing relators is small.").
9 For a summary and critical discussion of this scholarship, see ALEX STEIN, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 141-71 (2005).
10 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1484-87 0999)-
" See STEIN, supra note 9, at 3-8; see also James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in
Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 9o (1982) (developing a general process-cost theory of torts); Douglas
Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 (2003) (rationalizing "fixation" and
"creativity" requirements for copyright protection as savers of factfinding costs); Fred C. Zacha-
rias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 711-14 (1986) (rationalizing tort liability limitations
by focusing on the societal need to contain the costs of litigation).
12 See generally Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L.
REV. 843 (1981) (discussing various evidentiary presumptions and their underlying rationales);
Antonio E. Bernardo et al., A Theory of Legal Presumptions, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2000) (de-
veloping an economic model of evidentiary presumptions that mediate between litigation costs
and incentives for primary behavior).
13 For a seminal account of how to use evidence-production costs as a proxy for the adequacy
of the producer's primary behavior, see Chris William Sanchirico, Relying on the Information of
Interested - and Potentially Dishonest - Parties, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV 320 (2001). See also
Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 307, 312-21 (1994); Chris William Sanchirico, Games, Information, and Evidence Produc-
tion: With Application to English Legal History, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 342 (2000) (analyzing
the tradeoff between factfinding that relies on disinterested witnesses to determine actors' be-
havior and factfinding that determines actors' behavior by their costly signals); JEREMY BEN-
THAM, 2 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRAC-
TICE 435-44 (1827) (pioneering the idea of "preappointed evidence" - a cost-saving rule under
which specified evidence conclusively settles conflicts over disputed facts).
14 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 157-67; see also Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to
Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114
HARV. L. REV. 430 (2ooo) (justifying the right to silence as a mechanism that elicits credible sig-
naling from criminal defendants by reducing criminals' incentive to pool with innocents).
1s See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON.
169, 184, 188, 192 (1968); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
523201o]
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unquestionably important and insightful. Yet, it fails to notice that the
cost of evidence is not the only evidence-related hurdle that our legal
system faces. Inefficiencies might occur not only when the cost of evi-
dence is high, but also when it is low. In this Essay, we hope to rectify
this omission.
The Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, we provide a detailed ac-
count of standard economic models of optimal behavior and then show
how attention to evidence changes the main results. In Part II, we
demonstrate how evidentiary motivations distort actors' primary be-
havior in various legal areas, including tort, property, contract, crimi-
nal, and intellectual property law. In Part III, we consider the possi-
bility that evidence-generating behavior may be socially desirable
despite its distortionary effect on primary behavior because it facili-
tates liability determinations and improves courts' accuracy. A short
conclusion follows.
I. EVIDENTIARY DISTORTIONS
The principle of harm minimization is a central tenet of law and
economics. According to this principle, legal rules ought to minimize
aggregate social harm, defined as the grand total of the cost of the
harm for those who suffer it and the cost of its avoidance or abatement
for those who are best situated to prevent or reduce it. As Ronald
Coase showed, when transaction costs are sufficiently low, private par-
ties can achieve this goal by private ordering that leads to coordinated
minimization of the harm.16 In the majority of cases, however, when
transaction costs are high and private coordination is impracticable,
the legal system should step in and interpose rules that regulate poten-
tially harmful activities by allocating the burden of preventing the
harm to the appropriate actor.
In performing this task, efficiency-minded lawmakers should be
guided by the "cheapest cost avoider" criterion." According to this
criterion, devised by Guido Calabresi, the burden of preventing (or
abating) a harm should be placed on the person best situated to per-
form this task cheaply.' 8 In the simplest two-party scenario, the choice
will be between the wrongdoer and the victim. Consider the case of
an accident between a car and a bicycle rider that caused the latter a
harm of $3000. Assume that the car driver could have avoided the
Economic Analysis, iii HARV. L. REV. 869, 873-74 (1998) (arguing that courts should take de-
fendants' probability of escaping liability into account when calculating punitive damages).
16 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. i (1960).
1 See GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONoMIc
ANALYSIS 95-129, 174-97, 266-73 (1970) (developing the "cheapest cost avoider" method for min-
imizing the cost of accidents).
18 Id. at 135.
[Vol. 124:5185i24
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harm by expending $iooo and that the victim could have prevented it
only at a cost of $2000. In this example, the car driver is the cheapest
cost avoider and should therefore be held liable for the harm he in-
flicted on the bicycle rider.'9
In more complicated cases involving multiple parties, the task of
identifying the cheapest cost avoider becomes more complex. 20  Fur-
thermore, determining the cheapest cost avoider may be even more
challenging in cases in which the prevention efforts of the parties are
interdependent. In such cases, the cheapest way to prevent the harm
requires a certain contribution by each party.2 1 Although these com-
plications can - and do - increase the cost of identifying the cheap-
est cost avoider, they do not undermine the general validity of the
principle.
Indeed, the cheapest cost avoider principle has won over many di-
verse advocates. 22 Even though it was originally developed in the con-
text of tort liability, scholars have applied the principle in many other
areas of the law, effectively turning it into a general principle of as-
signing liability for harm.2 3
It bears emphasis that the main function of the cheapest cost
avoider principle is not distributional. Rather, it embodies the more
general idea of harm minimization. The imposition of liability on the
party best positioned to minimize harm cheaply is intended to induce
that party to behave in a socially optimal way. Specifically, this prin-
ciple is designed to guide the primary behavior of individual actors in
a way that aligns those actors' private interests with societal goals.
19 We assume for simplicity's sake that in this case the relative costs of prevention for the par-
ties are independent of each other.
20 See generally IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 31-35 (1993) (under-
scoring informational difficulties in the identification of the cheapest cost avoider).
21 For example, these contributions may amount to $soo for the driver and $400 for the bicycle
rider. The total cost of preventing the harm ($900) would thus fall below $iooo.
22 See, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Nuno Garoupa, Least-Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy of
Common Safety, 25 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 235, 235-36 (2009) (attesting that the cheapest cost avoid-
er principle "is unanimously recognized as desirable").
23 See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal Contracts, 17
GEO. MASON L. REV. 483, 530 (2010) (discussing reliance on the cheapest cost avoider criterion
in allocating losses from illegal contracts); TIn-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 523, 554-57 (2010) (using the cheapest cost avoider principle to allocate responsibility for
avoidable errors in patent claims); James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, io8
MICH. L. REV. 323, 346-47 (2009) (using the cheapest cost avoider standard in ascribing liability
for securities fraud); Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1272 (2009) (recognizing the cheapest cost avoider principle as one ap-
proach to land use regulation); Henry E. Smith, The Harm in Blackmail, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 861,
883 (1998) (applying the cheapest cost avoider criterion to criminal blackmail); Stewart E. Sterk,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, io6 MICH. L. REV. 1285,
1314-16 (2oo8) (using the cheapest cost avoider criterion in allocating the responsibility for uncer-
tainty about property rights).
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The accepted lore among law and economics scholars is that appro-
priately designed rules of torts, property, intellectual property, criminal
law, and the like will secure this critical alignment between private
and social interests.2 4 That is, the conceptualization of substantive le-
gal rules that allocate entitlements and remedies in accordance with
the cheapest cost avoider principle will induce the relevant actors to
reduce the aggregate cost of harm and avoidance measures to the bare
minimum. Indeed, the real challenge from the standpoint of efficiency
is not to identify the party who is best situated to reduce the grand to-
tal cost of harm and preventive measures per se, but rather to induce
that party to reduce that grand total to the lowest possible amount.
The following example is illustrative. Assume that a cement plant
is producing loud noise that causes a harm of $100,000 to Alice, who
lives nearby. The noise level can be reduced in one of two ways: First,
the plant can implement a new production technique at a cost of
$i,ooo,ooo and thereby eliminate the problem. Second, Alice can in-
stall a set of double-pane windows that will block out all the noise at a
cost of $20,000. Under these facts, it is clear that the socially desirable
way to solve the noise problem is to install the double-pane windows.
An efficiency-minded judge should therefore order Alice to install the
windows. Of course, there is also the question of which party should
pay for the installation. This, however, is a purely distributional ques-
tion. 2 5 If the judge thinks on fairness grounds that the plant, rather
than Alice, should bear the cost of installing the windows, the judge
can supplement the order by requiring the plant to reimburse Alice for
her expenses. Hence, the cheapest cost avoider (here, Alice) is not nec-
essarily the party who should incur the cost of implementing the pre-
ventive measure.
The decision of who should bear the cost of abatement is of great
significance to the parties. Yet from the standpoint of societal welfare,
it is completely secondary. The main goal is to ensure that the noise
problem is eliminated at the lowest possible cost - in this case,
$20,000. Any expenditure beyond this amount is socially wasteful and,
hence, should be discouraged. For instance, if Alice had another op-
tion of eliminating the noise, say by erecting an acoustic barrier at a
cost of $5o,ooo, efficiency would militate against the adoption of this
24 See sources cited supra note 23.
25 Indeed, there is a debate in the law and economics literature over whether distributional
goals should be carried out by substantive legal rules or only through the tax system. For the
former view, see Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty:
Theory and Legal Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 279 (2oo6); and Chris William Sanchirico, Tax-
es Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797
(2ooo). For the latter view, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
526 [VOL. 124-518
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measure, as it represents a waste of $30,000 - the difference between
the cost of this measure ($5o,ooo) and the cost of the double-pane win-
dows ($20,000).
Furthermore, standard law and economics analysis assumes that
parties will invariably comply with the principle of harm minimiza-
tion.26 Actors who are best positioned to minimize the relevant harm
at the lowest possible cost will indeed try to do so.2 7 For instance, in
our previous example, Alice is expected to install the double-pane win-
dows on her own and then sue the plant for reimbursement.
A key assumption of the law and economics movement is that ac-
tors respond to incentives. 28 Accordingly, the role of substantive legal
rules is to incentivize actors to comply with the prescriptions of utility
maximization and avoid unnecessary waste of resources.2 9 In Alice's
case, the law's task is to ensure that Alice adopts the socially desirable
prevention measure - the double-pane windows. If Alice were to im-
plement a wasteful measure, such as an acoustic barrier, she would not
be entitled to recover the additional cost of that measure from the
plant.
This canonical account is flawed, however, as it ignores the central-
ity of the adjudicative mechanism through which primary-behavior
rules are implemented.30 In particular, it pays no heed to the key role
of evidence in establishing legal entitlements and liabilities. If judges
and juries were omniscient, this omission would be of no consequence.
In a world with perfect information, judges and juries would never err
in implementing substantive legal rules. In that world, entitlements
and liabilities would always be assigned properly. Importantly, in such
a world, there would be no need for adjudicative processes to begin
with.31 Since all individuals in that world would be perfectly in-
formed, there would be no need to expend resources on evidence pro-
duction and factfinding.
Of course, this world is unreal. In the real world, adjudicators
must decide cases based on observable and verifiable information -
or, in legal parlance, evidence. Rational actors will always be mindful
of the centrality of evidence and information production to their suc-
26 See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 135-38.
27 Id.
28 See POSNER, supra note I, at 4.
29 Id. at 24-25, 167-70, 2,5-I9; see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 1-4 (2004); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 293
(5th ed. 2008) (noting contract doctrine's contribution to efficiency, which "requires uniting know-
ledge and control over resources at least cost" (emphasis omitted)).
30 Law and economics scholars acknowledge, however, that adjudication costs may distort the
allocation of substantive liabilities and entitlements. See POSNER, supra note i, at 563-64, 577.
31 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 33 (arguing that evidentiary rules and processes are not needed
when adjudicators are epistemically infallible).
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cess in future litigation. Although the rules and standards of conduct
are specified by substantive law, actual liability determinations, as well
as remedies, depend on the evidence parties can produce. For exam-
ple, under a negligence regime, the question of whether Andy can re-
cover compensation from Bob, who caused damage to his car, depends
on Andy's ability to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Bob was negligent. If Andy fails to produce the requisite evidence, he
will lose his case even though Bob was in fact negligent. The same
holds true for all rights and remedies. Rights and remedies do not op-
erate in a vacuum. Indeed, they are meaningless for real world actors
unless those actors can produce the evidence necessary to substantiate
them.
An important implication of this insight is that in the real world
evidentiary motivations will often affect actors' primary behavior in
ways that are inconsistent with the demands of economic theory. The
desire to possess convincing evidence will cause rational parties to ex-
pend resources to produce such evidence even when doing so is social-
ly wasteful. Each actor has a strong incentive to behave in a way that
generates evidence favorable to her case in court. This evidentiary
motivation will often undermine substantive law's efforts to minimize
harm at the lowest possible cost. The incentive to minimize harm set
by substantive legal rules will be effective only when following the
rules yields the most favorable evidence the actor can generate. Ob-
viously, this will not happen in many cases. The evidence that an ac-
tor can generate depends on the factual circumstances of her case, and
those circumstances depend on empirical contingencies. They do not
track the desirability of the actor's behavior from the cheapest cost
avoider's point of view or from any other normative standpoint.
To illustrate, return to the example of the accident between Andy
and Bob. Recall that Andy can avoid the collision but only by incur-
ring a nonnegligible harm to his car. Letting the accident occur will
cause a considerably greater harm to Andy's car but will also produce
irrefutable evidence of Bob's negligence. Will Andy avoid the colli-
sion? If Andy is a self-interest maximizer, he will avoid the accident
only if he is guaranteed to recover compensation for the harm he will
incur in the process. Otherwise, he will choose the collision option
even though it will result in a much greater combined harm to both
automobiles. From Andy's vantage point, the decisive determinant is
not social welfare. Rather, it is the payoff Andy will receive after
suing Bob or Bob's insurance company. Allowing the collision to hap-
pen guarantees Andy a payoff of zero, whereas avoiding the collision
produces a high probability of a negative payoff since Andy will be
unlikely to prove Bob's negligence.
This result is robust and ubiquitous. The evidentiary overlay is
always present and must be taken into account by rational actors.
Evidence is the filter through which rights and entitlements are per-
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ceived. The distortion caused by evidentiary motivations cannot be
easily fixed and in many cases cannot be fixed at all. Furthermore, it
is not confined to potential plaintiffs. A similar motivation often ani-
mates the decisions of potential defendants, as exemplified by the per-
vasive practice of defensive medicine.3 2  Defensive medicine is a so-
cially wasteful activity. Yet, it cannot be eradicated because it
produces valuable evidence for doctors and medical institutions that
may make the difference between winning and losing a medical mal-
practice case. In this area and others, no legal intervention can elimi-
nate the evidentiary distortion we identified.
In other contexts, the distortionary effect is caused by the law itself.
This effect occurs when the law conditions the availability of certain
remedies on the occurrence of repeated violations or the accumulation
of harm.33 In such cases, the inefficient evidence-generating incentive
can be cured by changing the content of substantive legal rules. Yet,
even in this scenario, the fix is not simple. As we will show, changing
the design of substantive law - or of the evidentiary requirements
necessary to prove one's case - will lead to other inefficiencies. For
example, if lawmakers were to waive the harm requirement and make
all remedies available to successful plaintiffs regardless of the level of
harm they suffered, this reform would put all wrongdoers on a par and
prevent courts from differentiating among wrongdoers based on the
harm criterion. In the area of criminal law, elimination of the harm
criterion would create arbitrariness in the imposition of punishments
and social stigma. 3 4  All other bases for convicting and punishing
people are morally questionable, conceptually unstable, and operation-
ally malleable.35  As such, they would make it too easy for the gov-
ernment to manipulate criminal processes and deny individuals their
basic liberties.3 6
32 See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
33 For a striking example, see Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3 d 332 (4th Cir.
2oo6), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2036 (2007), which held that a wild, but single, racist exclamation
referring to black people generally does not make an African American worker's environment
hostile for purposes of antiretaliation and other remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Id. at 340-43. This decision is both unfair and inefficient in that it incentivizes victims
of racism to pile up evidence of a hostile environment by enduring multiple slurs. For a detailed
discussion of cumulative harm requirements, see infra sections I.B-C, pp. 535-42.
34 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for
Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 266 (1975).
3s See I JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARM TO OTH-
ERS 31-36 (1984) (explaining why criminal law should penalize people only for causing harm con-
ceptualized as a morally wrongful invasion of another's interest); George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence
About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. 161I, 1612 (2004) (underscoring that the harm requirement is cen-
tral to the "nature and purpose" of criminal law).
36 See Robinson, supra note 34, at 266-67.
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These constraints make the extant evidentiary requirements diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to dispense with. The distortionary effect of
evidence-seeking on primary behavior consequently becomes en-
trenched. In Part II, we demonstrate the prevalence of this effect by
cataloguing various legal doctrines in which it is present. In each case,
we also assess whether the distortionary effect can be fixed and, if so,
at what cost.
II. DOCTRINE
In this Part, we show that actors' quests for evidence distort pri-
mary behavior in multiple legal areas.37 We demonstrate that the dis-
tortion of primary behavior by evidence-seeking conduct is a pervasive
and largely ineradicable phenomenon. That said, it should be empha-
sized that we do not claim that distortion will occur in all cases. Dis-
tortion is likely to occur only in those cases where production of evi-
dence by a party will allow her to prove her case by a preponderance
of the evidence in civil cases, or beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
cases.38 In other cases, when the outcome of the case - favorable or
unfavorable - is certain irrespective of the evidence a party can pro-
duce, no distortionary effect is expected. With this caveat in mind, we
can now embark on our doctrinal odyssey. We begin with criminal
law and then proceed to the fields of torts, property, and intellectual
property.
A. Criminal Law
Evidence plays a crucial role in every decision concerning criminal
liability. The police can arrest a suspect only if they demonstrate
"probable cause" - evidence indicating that the suspect committed, or
was about to commit, a criminal offense.39 As the criminal process
progresses toward indictment and conviction, the evidentiary require-
ments become more demanding. For example, in order to prove con-
37 It is quite possible that this effect can be found in all legal areas, but since proving this hy-
pothesis is beyond the scope of this Essay, we leave this ambitious claim for future projects.
38 From a potential defendant's side, distortion will occur when production of evidence is like-
ly to exonerate the defendant.
39 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3, at 163-68 (5th ed. 2009)
(explicating the "probable cause" requirement for arrest); see also Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 4o6 (2006) (holding that evidence of ongoing violence constitutes "probable cause"
because the Fourth Amendment does not require the police "to wait until another blow renders]
someone 'unconscious' or 'semi-conscious' or worse"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35 n.i (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "probable cause" does not require that police officers wait
until a suspect "commit[s] a crime before they are able to 'seize' that person"). Note that, upon
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is carrying a weapon and might use it against the police officer
or another person, the officer can stop the suspect to search for weapons without arresting him.
Id. at 27 (majority opinion).
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spiracy, the prosecution must produce evidence of an "overt act" by
which the alleged conspirators have begun implementing their criminal
goal. 40 Absent such evidence, the conspirators' mere talk will fall
short of showing the requisite endangerment of society.41 By the same
token, in order to establish that a defendant accused of a criminal at-
tempt crossed the line of "preparation" and moved on to commit the
crime itself, the prosecution needs to adduce evidence demonstrating
that the defendant made a "substantial step" toward the consumma-
tion of the contemplated crime.4 2  Finally, in all criminal trials, the
prosecution is required to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" each and
every element of the crime the defendant is accused of committing. 43
This proof requirement extends to the defendant's conduct, to the con-
duct's consequences, and to whether the defendant acted willfully and
intended to bring about those prohibited consequences. 4 4
Each of these evidentiary requirements makes perfect sense. The
criminal law system tries to apprehend, censure, deter, and incapaci-
tate people whose actions pose a serious danger to society.45 To attain
these goals, the system authorizes police, prosecutors, and courts to
impose severe limitations on persons' liberties. Under appropriate cir-
cumstances, a person can be arrested, searched, deprived of her be-
longings, prosecuted, convicted, and punished. These measures inflict
substantial harm upon criminal defendants and suspects. The system
consequently needs safeguards against arbitrary and erroneous inflic-
tions of that harm. Those safeguards integrate two sets of rules. The
first set contains the evidentiary requirements for proper application of
law enforcement measures against individuals. These requirements
specify the nature and the quantum of evidence that justify a person's
40 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw § 12.2(b), at 626 & n.52 (4 th ed. 2003) (re-
viewing the "overt act" requirement for conspiracy).
41 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957) ("The function of the overt act in a
conspiracy prosecution is . .. to manifest 'that the conspiracy is at work' .... (quoting Carlson
v. United States, 187 F.2d 366, 370 (ioth Cir. 1951))).
42 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01() (1962) ("A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime,
he ... purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circumstances as he believes them
to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to cul-
minate in his commission of the crime."); LAFAVE, supra note 40, § II.4(e), at 594 ("The Model
Penal Code's 'substantial step' language is to be found in the great majority of the attempt stat-
utes in the modern recodifications."); see also United States v. Prichard, 781 F.2d 179, 182 (ioth
Cir. 1986) ("The police need not wait until the defendant is on the verge of committing the specific
act that constitutes the crime. If this were the rule, much of the preventative purpose of inchoate
liability would be vitiated.").
43 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 172-83 (outlining the scope of the "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" requirement and analyzing the requirement's rationale).
44 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2oo).
45 See SHAVELL, supra note 29, at 543-44.
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arrest, search, seizure, prosecution, conviction, and punishment. The
second set constitutes an assembly of remedial rules that respond to
violations of the evidentiary requirements. These rules void arrests,
suppress evidence, quash convictions, mandate acquittals, set aside
punishments, and order retrials. As a supplementary remedy, they also
allow wronged suspects and defendants to recover compensation from
the government and its law enforcement officers. 4 6
The remedial rules thus undo the results of a defective enforcement
of criminal law. The ex ante effect of those rules is to incentivize com-
pliance with the evidentiary requirements by police, prosecutors, and
trial judges. Under those rules, police and prosecutors have a strong
incentive to secure the trial and appellate courts' affirmation of the
evidence underlying a person's arrest, search, seizure, prosecution,
conviction, and punishment. Whether courts will accept the police's
and the prosecutor's case depends on the strength of the evidence in-
criminating the defendant. The stronger the evidence, the better are
the police's and the prosecutor's chances to secure the defendant's ar-
rest, conviction, and punishment.
Unfortunately, however, the strength of inculpatory evidence posi-
tively correlates with the defendant's advancement of his criminal en-
deavor. The closer the defendant moves toward the accomplishment
of the offense, the stronger the evidence. The police's role as a law en-
forcer consequently involves an irremediable tension between two so-
cietal goals. On the one hand, the police are required to prevent crime
and minimize the harm that criminals inflict upon individual victims
and communities. On the other hand, in order to deter crime and keep
criminals off the street, the police often have no choice but to allow
criminals to endanger and even harm individuals and communities
since such delayed action is the only way to obtain inculpatory evi-
dence. This tension is vividly illustrated by the classic case of People
v. Rizzo. 47 In that case, the police had only one way of generating
evidence that could secure the defendant's conviction: allowing armed
criminals to approach and start robbing their victim, despite the
46 This remedy is available against state governments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2oo6) and is
available against federal agents under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2oo6) (underscor-
ing growing effectiveness of compensatory redress as a remedy for violations of suspects' and de-
fendants' rights by government agents); see also Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of
Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809,
827-45 (20I0) (carrying out empirical investigation of Bivens suits and reporting their relative
success).
47 158 N.E. 888 (N.Y. 1927).
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unnecessary emotional and sometimes physical harm suffered by the
victim. 48
This method of gathering evidence is relatively common.49 More-
over, police often switch from a passive strategy that merely allows a
criminal to commit the contemplated offense to an active encourage-
ment of the crime, known as "entrapment,"5 0 or to undercover activi-
ties that involve police agents' participation in the criminal enter-
prise.5  These evidence-generating practices have encompassed the
commission of many serious crimes, including drug dealing, 52 sexual
48 See id. at 888-89; see also State v. Duke, 709 SO. 2d 58o, 581-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that an alleged child molester was arrested too early to qualify as an attempter); Com-
monwealth v. Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d 698, 703 (Mass. 1990) (holding that riding in a car with a loaded
gun in an unsuccessful search for the intended victim was insufficient to support a conviction for
attempted assault and battery); People v. Coleman, 86 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Mich. 1957) (noting that
"the purchase of a hunting rifle, secretly intended for the murder of the neighbor" is "merely an
act of [noncriminal] preparation"). See generally Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating
Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L. REV. 1197, 1234-41 (2007) (explaining how the tension between
retribution and deterrence complicates the standards for identifying and punishing inchoate
crimes).
49 For example, before making a drug-related arrest or stop-and-frisk, the police must wait for
the suspected drug deal to be carried out, despite the risk of violence that such deals involve. See,
e.g., People v. McRay, 416 N.E.2d 1015, 1019-21 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that an exchange of a glas-
sine envelope, the "telltale sign" of heroin, will constitute the lowest level of proof required for
"probable cause" if money is passed in exchange for the envelope, if participants behave furtively
or evasively, or if the exchange occurs in an area rampant with narcotics activity); Common-
wealth v. E.M., 735 A.2d 654, 659-61 (Pa. 1999) (holding that an exchange of a plastic baggie typ-
ically used to transport drugs constitutes evidence that allows the police to stop and frisk the sus-
pects under the "reasonable suspicion" standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
50 Entrapment is generally permitted, provided that the government does not overstep the
"line . . . between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). That is, "[w]here the Government has induced an
individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue .. . the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior
to first being approached by Government agents." Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-
49 (1992) (citing United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); see also United
States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 010 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring) ("If the police en-
tice someone to commit a crime who would not have done so without their blandishments, and
then arrest him and he is prosecuted, convicted, and punished, law enforcement resources are
squandered in the following sense: resources that could and should have been used in an effort to
reduce the nation's unacceptably high crime rate are used instead in the entirely sterile activity of
first inciting and then punishing a crime. However, if the police are just inducing someone to
commit sooner a crime he would have committed eventually, but to do so in controlled circum-
stances where the costs to the criminal justice system of apprehension and conviction are mini-
mized, the police are economizing on resources.").
51 See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 548 ("[Tlhere can be no dispute that the Government may use un-
dercover agents to enforce the law. 'It is well settled that the fact that officers or employees of the
Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not
defeat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in crimi-
nal enterprises."' (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932))). For a superb study
of this phenomenon, see generally Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover
Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2009).
52 See Job, supra note 51, at 156.
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offenses,53 fraud,54 theft,5 5 and perjury.56  These practices are unques-
tionably harmful. They are, however, also unquestionably necessary.57
Banning these practices might expose society to a greater harm.5 8
This tradeoff between the deterrence and incapacitation of crimi-
nals, on the one hand, and the prevention of individual crimes, on the
other hand, is ubiquitous. Whether there is a way to resolve this
tradeoff satisfactorily is a difficult question that we address below in
Part III. At this stage, we only identify the social cost of evidence-
seeking in criminal law or, more precisely, how the quest for inculpato-
ry evidence distorts the primary behavior of police and prosecutors.
The extent to which this distortion is inevitable and needs to be toler-
ated is a separate issue.
53 See, e.g., State v. Yegan, 221 P3d 1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (police detective used the inter-
net to pose as a fourteen-year-old girl, to conduct a sexually charged online conversation, and to
arrange a date with a child molester in order to get him arrested); Duke, 709 SO. 2d at 58, (police
detective used the internet to present himself as a twelve-year-old girl and arrange a sex date with
the defendant, who was arrested too early to qualify as an attempter); State v. Morris, 272 N.W.2d
35, 35-36 (Minn. 1978) (to obtain evidence of defendant's engagement in prostitution, undercover
police officer partially undressed himself and negotiated sex for hire with defendant). Detectives
have at times employed even more extreme methods. See, e.g., State v. Burkland, 775 N.W.2d
372, 373-74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (to obtain evidence of defendant's engagement in prostitution,
undercover police officer posed as a paying customer and initiated sexual contact with
defendant - a behavior that the court found "offensive to due process," id. at 376); see also Okin
v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3 d 415, 427-28 (2d Cir. 2009) (observing that a
police officer may violate due process when he affirmatively creates or enhances violence against
a private person).
54 See Joh, supra note 51, at 156-57 & 156 n.6.
55 See id.
56 See id.
5 The Supreme Court recognized the necessity of these practices long ago. See Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932) (holding that "[a]rtifice and stratagem . . . employed to
catch those engaged in criminal enterprises" are permissible, and clarifying that "[t]he appropriate
object of this permitted activity, frequently essential to the enforcement of the law, is to reveal the
criminal design; to expose the illicit traffic, the prohibited publication, the fraudulent use of the
mails, the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses, and thus to disclose the would-be violators of the
law").
58 See, e.g., FBI Undercover Guidelines: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil &
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 7th Cong. 130 (1981) (statement of Phi-
lip B. Heymann, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice) ("[U]ndercover
operations are extremely effective in aiding us to identify, prosecute and convict the guilty and to
reduce the chances that innocent parties will be caught up in the criminal process. . . . [T]hrough
undercover techniques, we can muster the testimony of credible law enforcement agents, often
augmented by unimpeachable video and oral tapes which graphically reveal the defendant's im-
age and voice engaged in the commission of crime. These techniques aid the truth-finding process
by generally avoiding issues of mistaken identity or perjurious efforts by a witness to implicate an
innocent person."). See generally Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrap-
ment, 70 Mo. L. REV. 387 (2o5) (pioneering economic analysis of entrapment and sting opera-
tions that identifies these operations' utility).
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B. Torts and Property
In these areas of the law, proof of causation and damage is a pre-
requisite for an entitlement-holder's success in a suit against the al-
leged infringer. The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant acted in a way prohibited by her entitle-
ment and caused, or will likely cause, the harm that the entitlement
guards against.5 9 In other words, the plaintiff must prove that she was
wronged by the defendant. To this end, she must provide evidence
showing that she suffered, or is about to suffer, a deprivation as a re-
sult of the defendant's wrongdoing. Failure to do so will result in a
court decision that denies the plaintiff the legal remedy that she seeks.
These basic evidentiary rules are aligned with common sense. Yet,
they systematically distort the primary behavior of an entitlement-
holder who faces an ongoing or imminent infringement of her entitle-
ment. These rules motivate the entitlement-holder to prefer causally
proven damage, however extensive it may be, to damage unsupported
by evidence of causation. This evidence-driven preference is perfectly
rational. As a practical matter, causally proven damage will likely win
the entitlement-holder's suit against the infringer, while causally un-
evidenced damage will certainly lose it. This pivotal factor makes the
entitlement-holder anomalously indifferent to the sizes of the alterna-
tive damages. From a social welfare perspective, she should always
prefer a smaller damage to a bigger one and act accordingly. The en-
titlement-holder, however, will opt for a bigger damage whenever it is
actionable and the smaller damage is not. Evidentiary rules that apply
in tort and property cases thus create a serious misalignment between
the entitlement-holder's and society's interests.
This misalignment explains a prospective plaintiff's quest for im-
pact evidence that unequivocally points to the wrongdoer. In our first
introductory example, the collision of Bob's car with Andy's car gave
Andy the impact evidence that would secure Andy's victory in a suit
against Bob. The same misalignment of interest also explains a prop-
erty owner's motivation to expose her property to continuous and ever-
growing harm resulting from a defendant's activity. Cumulative harm
stemming from a single causal factor - the defendant's activity -
identifies the defendant as responsible for every incident of the harm.
In our second introductory example, this evidentiary benefit explains a
property owner's decision to expose her house to continuous pollution
caused by the toxins emitted by a neighboring plant.
More often than not, evidence of impact and cumulative harm
makes a difference between winning a suit and losing it. For that rea-
59 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 219-25 (outlining and rationalizing the "preponderance of the
evidence" requirement for civil trials).
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son, a prospective plaintiff will try to obtain such evidence even when
she can minimize her damage by taking a different action. As we al-
ready explained, this preference is inelastic: the size of the damage that
a prospective plaintiff stands to incur will not affect this preference
(save for cases in which the wrongdoer might be insolvent and where
money does not substitute for the plaintiff's harm).
The aforementioned preference will be exercised not only by prop-
erty owners who face an environmental hazard or other nuisance, but
also by owners encountering an imminent or ongoing trespass. Those
owners have a strong incentive to allow the trespasser to enter their
property and even cause some damage to that property and its fix-
tures. Allowing the trespasser to commit those wrongs would generate
evidence that will virtually guarantee the owner's success in a suit for
an injunction and damages. This strategy is particularly attractive in
jurisdictions that allow aggrieved property owners to recover multiple
damages from trespassers. 60 By contrast, acting prematurely might re-
sult in a court decision that denies the owner the desired relief, thereby
wasting her litigation effort and expenses.
The legal system cannot undo the distortion caused by evidentiary
motivations. Abolishing the proof-of-harm requirements is not an op-
tion. Doing so would undercut the accuracy of adjudicative decisions
and clog courts' dockets with frivolous suits and defenses. 61 The con-
sequent inefficacy of the adjudication system would erode individuals'
incentives to comply with the law. 62
Expanding the doctrines of comparative fault 63 and avoidable con-
sequences64 is not a viable alternative either. Presently, these doctrines
preclude a tort victim from recovering compensation for self-inflicted
damage - damage originating from the victim's own fault that
merged with the wrongdoer's negligence. 65 The doctrines thus entitle
the wrongdoer to pay only for the damage that she caused the victim,
60 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 Nw. U. L. REV.
1823, 1834-36 (2009) (outlining and explaining multiple-damage provisions as a remedy for
trespass).
61 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 144-48.
62 See id.
63 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS § 202, at 509-10 (20oo) (describing the prevalent
understanding of the comparative fault doctrine as based on a "comparison of the unjustified risks
taken by each [party]" where "[tihe only negligence to be compared is negligence that is a cause in
fact and also a proximate cause in the sense that the harm caused was the kind of harm put at
risk," id. at 509).
64 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at
458 (5th ed. 1984) ("The rule of avoidable consequences comes into play after a legal wrong
has occurred, but while some damages may still be averted, and bars recovery only for such
damages.").
65 For a comparison of these two doctrines, see DOBBS, supra note 63, §§ 203-05, at 510-17.
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as opposed to the damage that the victim brought upon himself.66
Neither of the two doctrines requires an innocent victim, who did
nothing to damage himself, to fend off the consequences of the wrong-
doer's action by inflicting upon himself a less substantial - and prac-
tically noncompensable - damage. Expansion of those doctrines into
a general principle that requires victims to opt for a lesser evil would
produce deleterious effects. As a threshold matter, allowing a wrong-
doer to enlist the victim as her risk-management partner is patently
anomalous. Wrongdoers should not be allowed to dictate to their vic-
tims what to do. Furthermore, the victim's universal duty to mitigate
the effect of the wrongdoer's tort would dilute the deterrence of
wrongdoers.6 1 Implementing this duty would also be costly. In adju-
dicating alleged breaches of the duty, courts would have to resolve
complex issues pertaining to the victim's ability to react to the wrong-
doing better than he did. In the case of Andy and Bob, for instance,
these issues would include the risk calculations that Andy was sup-
posed to make and the time frame within which he reasonably could
have made those calculations.
Prospective plaintiffs are not the only actors whose primary be-
havior is distorted by a quest for favorable evidence. Evidence-
seeking also motivates prospective defendants to behave in a socially
inefficient, but privately advantageous, fashion. Defensive medicine is
probably the best example of such behavior. We mentioned this phe-
nomenon in Part I and will now illustrate it in a way that highlights
the functioning of custom evidence rules in medical malpractice
litigation.
Consider a doctor who diagnoses a patient and determines that the
patient must undergo urgent surgery. The doctor is confident about
her diagnosis and estimates that no additional tests are necessary.
Medical custom, however, advises doctors to run a series of expensive
and time-consuming tests to confirm such diagnoses. This custom is
not compulsory: failure to follow it does not in itself constitute medical
malpractice. 68  Yet, following the custom practically insulates doctors
66 See id. § 204, at 5 11-14.
67 Throughout this Essay, we follow the traditional common law approach to causation rather
than the "reciprocal causation" concept of Ronald Coase. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry
E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean 26-27 (Mar. 9, 2010) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2oio/merrill-smith.pdf (noting that the
positive law did not adopt the Coasean idea of reciprocal causation).
68 As a general rule, doctors must comply with certain medical customs and protocols. See
Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285, 300-03 (2008)
(outlining and explaining the custom rules applicable in medical malpractice disputes). Failure to
comply with those customs and protocols amounts to malpractice. But there are nonmandatory
customs as well, and a doctor may deviate from any of them if she believes that the patient re-
quires a different treatment or diagnostic procedure. These nonmandatory customs include pro-
tocols regarding "the timing and frequency of physical and radiographic ... examinations" that
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from suits for malpractice. 6 9 By running the customary tests, the doc-
tor will generate evidence that will defeat any malpractice suit that the
patient might file if the surgery does not produce the desired result.7 0
The doctor therefore prefers to run the tests and delay the surgery.
Her self-serving evidence-generating endeavor blocks primary activity
that could benefit the patient and society at large.
Note that even if adjudicators were to stop using custom as the
benchmark for assigning liability, it would not eliminate doctors' mo-
tivation to engage in defensive medicine in order to produce evidence
that would help them defeat medical malpractice suits. Independently
of the chosen liability standard, doctors will continue to generate evi-
dence demonstrating that they went beyond the call of duty and took
extra measures to protect the health of their patients. Hence, changing
the legal standard is unlikely to remedy the problem.
C. Intellectual Property
For owners of intellectual property, the ability to obtain an injunc-
tion that fends off unauthorized users is economically vital." An in-
junction enforces the owner's right to exclude others from any use of
her patent, copyright, or trademark to which she does not agree.72
The availability of this remedy also forces potential users to negotiate
the terms of use with the owner and pay her the price she wishes to
charge. 3 In addition, the possibility of obtaining injunctive relief con-
fers upon the owner the power to veto undesired transactions.7 4 Final-
diagnose breast cancer. Bradley C. Nahrstadt & Christina D. Ketcham, A Primer on Defending
Breast Cancer Litigation, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 451, 464 (2002).
69 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 68, at 301 & nn.87-88, and sources cited therein.
70 The doctor may act in the same way when her primary motivation is risk aversion. See in-
fra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
71 See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Infor-
mation, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1781-82, 1784-86 (2007) (showing how an injunction-backed right to
exclude frequently facilitates efficient governance of intellectual property by its owner); see also
Eric E. Williams, Patent Reform: The Pharmaceutical Industry Prescription for Post-Grant Oppo-
sition and Remedies, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 354, 365 (2oo8) (attesting that "in-
junctions are vital to innovative drug companies" because "[w]ithout the power of injunctions,
they would not be able to prevent a generic drug company from placing inexpensive copies of
medicine in the marketplace").
72 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNO-
LOGICAL AGE 13 (rev. 4 th ed. 2007).
73 See, e.g., Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Com-
ment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Toll, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 65, 175 (2007)
("The threat of an injunction is an important tool to motivate would-be patent squatters to nego-
tiate a license or settle patent infringement litigation.").
74 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (ig8o) (explaining that "the
essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention"
and that "[clompulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system").
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ly, a timely injunction saves the owner the trouble of proving her in-
jury in court. 5
However, an aggrieved owner of intellectual property is not entitled
to a permanent injunction as a matter of course. 6 To obtain this
remedy, an owner must prove that she faces irreparable harm that
cannot be adequately remedied by monetary compensation and that
the hardship she would suffer, if not granted the injunction, outweighs
the inconvenience that the injunction would cause the defendant."
Moreover, courts are also instructed not to issue injunctions that dis-
serve the public interest.78
This discretionary formula is not as abstract as it appears to be.
Federal courts have developed case law that instructs adjudicators on
how to apply it." Specifically, the Federal Circuit has established a
presumptive rule that entitles a patent holder to an injunction upon
showing the defendant's continual infringement of her patent. 0 Other
courts have adopted similar rules in the areas of copyright8' and
7 See John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV.
2111, 2152 (2007) (attesting that "[tihe difficulty of assessing a reasonable royalty [for the use of a
patent] has in fact been one of the principal rationales for granting permanent injunctions").
76 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006) (refusing to establish
categorical rules with respect to injunctions in patent and copyright infringement cases and "re-
jectling] invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction
automatically follows a determination that a copyright [or a patent] has been infringed").
7 Id. at 391.
78 Id.
79 As Chief Justice Roberts explained in his concurrence in eBay, the discretionary formula is
not a "clean slate": the "long tradition of equity practice" that allowed patent holders to obtain
injunctions that fend off infringers ought to be read into this formula. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring). Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer have agreed with
this point. See id. at 394 (noting that Justices Scalia and Ginsburg joined the Chief Justice's con-
currence); id. at 395-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Chief Justice on the relevant
point, in an opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer).
80 See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3 d 683, 704 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[Olne who
elects to build a business on a product found to infringe cannot be heard to complain if an injunc-
tion against continuing infringement destroys the business so elected." (quoting Windsurfing Int'l,
Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Corning Glass Works v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting
that immediate irreparable damage is presumed in connection with a request for injunctive relief
from continued infringement); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("[W]here validity and continuing infringement have been clearly established, as in this case,
immediate irreparable harm is presumed." (footnote omitted)); cf Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
551 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2oo8) (attesting that, under the "balance of hardships" standard, it
is proper for a court to ignore a patent infringer's expenditures on designing and marketing the
infringing product).
81 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ'g, 507 E3 d 470, 492 (6th Cir. 2007)
("Not only is the issuance of a permanent injunction justified '[w]hen a copyright plaintiff has
established a threat of continuing infringement, he is entitled to an injunction."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990))); CBS Broad.,
Inc. v. EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 450 F3d 505, 518 n.25 (ixth Cir. 2006) ("Under the Copyright
Act, however, a plaintiff need not show irreparable harm in order to obtain a permanent injunc-
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trademark.8 2 Taken together, these rules form what might be called
the "continual infringement" doctrine. This doctrine effectively entitles
an aggrieved owner of intellectual property to enjoin the continual in-
fringer of her right. Courts will refuse to enjoin the infringer only
when an established public policy favors a different result83 or when
the owner's inequitable conduct makes her ineligible for injunctive re-
lief.84 Under such special circumstances, the owner must suffice her-
self with monetary relief.8 5
The "continual infringement" doctrine makes perfect sense. The
legal system cannot lightly grant property rule protection to a patent, a
copyright, or a trademark. Such protection imposes substantial restric-
tions on third parties and allows the holder of an intellectual property
right to engage in socially inefficient rent-seeking and holdouts.8 6  As
many scholars have pointed out, too much intellectual property protec-
tion may work to society's detriment.87 For these reasons, not every
tion, so long as there is past infringement and a likelihood of future infringement." (emphasis add-
ed) (citing Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499 (iith Cir. 1984))); see also Apple Inc. v.
Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding, pursuant to eBay, that "[o]ther
than for trademark infringement claims, there is no presumption of irreparable harm with respect
to a permanent injunction," but observing that although "[i]rreparable harm may not be pre-
sumed. . . in run-of-the-mill copyright litigation, such proof should not be difficult to establish,"
id. (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1215
(C.D. Cal. 2007)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
82 See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 118o (9th Cir. 1988) ("In-
junctive relief is the remedy of choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since there is
no adequate remedy at law for the injury caused by a defendant's continuing infringement."); see
also David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions After eBay,
99 TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1053-73 (2009) (discussing implications of eBay for trademark
law and arguing that the practice of remedying trademark violations with injunctions should
continue).
83 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
* See Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97
CALIF. L. REV. I, 32-33 (2009) (explaining the types of patentee behavior that should tip the
scales in favor of standards estoppel).
85 See id. at 32-34.
86 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 1-22 (2008); Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
280 SCIENCE 698, 700 (1998); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Essay, A Market-
place for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 395, 412-17 (2005) (discussing liability rule treatment for intel-
lectual property rights); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 258-69
(2009) (analyzing the ongoing depropertization of intellectual property rights, which reduces inef-
ficient rent-seeking and holdouts).
87 For criticism of the excessive protection of patents, see Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent
Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 419-25
(1999); Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 79, 87-89 (2ooi); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 86; Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore,
Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 71-83 (2004); Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 9o COLUM. L. REV. 839, 863-66
(1990); and Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and
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violation of an intellectual property right should be met with a perma-
nent injunction. Rather, the remedy should be reserved for those cases
where an infringement constitutes a serious violation of the owner's
entitlement and has no redeeming social value. The "continual in-
fringement" requirement serves as a useful proxy for the first element
of the discretionary formula: continual or ongoing infringements usual-
ly constitute serious incursions into the owner's domain of protected
rights.
The insistence on continual infringement comes at a price, however.
It has the obvious side effect of incentivizing intellectual property
owners to generate evidence of continual infringement. As a conse-
quence, owners of patents, copyrights, and trademarks may often de-
cide to sit idly by and allow multiple infringements of their rights to
occur. Such behavior would be socially inefficient when the owner can
protect her intellectual property rights at a lower cost. For example,
resources could be saved if rights holders were to sue infringers right
away upon discovering the first instance of infringement. Yet, when
an owner perceives a private benefit from obtaining an injunction, she
is likely to choose to delay her suit until she can prove repeated in-
fringement by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, in cases
in which the owner can choose between taking legal action against an
infringer upon detecting the first infringement and delaying the law-
suit until multiple infringements occur, she may often choose to do the
latter." Hence, under extant law, the owner has a perverse incentive
to underprotect her intellectual property and even set traps for unwary
infringers.
To illustrate, consider the following example. Assume that Mega-
Pharma holds a patent on a drug for treatment of cholesterol prob-
lems. MegaPharma gets wind of the fact that its much smaller rival,
NanoPharma, is about to launch its own medication for treating cho-
lesterol problems. MegaPharma knows from limited samples distrib-
uted by NanoPharma that the new medication infringes upon Mega-
Pharma's vaunted patent. MegaPharma can bring an infringement
suit right away or it can wait to sue until its rival sinks significant re-
sources into building a new plant and establishing a distribution chan-
the Patent Law, s J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30-32 (199). For criticism of the socially unnecessary
protection of trademarks, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 413, 414 (201o); and Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of
Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 66 (2009). For criticism of copyright's overbreadth, see Gideon Par-
chomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1509-i6 (2oo), and sources cited
therein.
88 Naturally, other considerations may affect the choice in this case. Chief among them is sol-
vency, or lack thereof. Specifically, if a rights holder estimates that the infringer does not have
sufficient financial resources to pay for the harm he caused, the rights holder may decide to pur-
sue legal action immediately, even if doing so jeopardizes the injunction.
2o1o] 541
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
nel. Preferring the former option over the latter achieves dramatic
cost savings. MegaPharma, however, would likely choose the latter
option because that option gives it a much better chance of obtaining
an injunction. 89
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE
Our discussion, thus far, has demonstrated how evidence-
generating conduct distorts primary behavior. We have also demon-
strated that this distortionary effect is robust and pervasive. Finally,
we have shown that the legal system cannot eliminate this effect by
modifying existing evidentiary and substantive rules since changing
the design of the rules would undercut the system's ability to advance
the important goals of deterrence and fairness. The legal system can-
not replace those rules with a lawless vacuum; it can only substitute
one evidentiary or substantive rule for a different rule. The necessity
of having some evidentiary and substantive rules makes it impossible
for the legal system to get rid of the evidence-seeking incentives that
motivate individuals to act against societal interest. No matter what
the system's rules are, a private actor's quest for favorable evidence
will often be misaligned with socially optimal behavior.
Yet, the effect of evidence seeking is not as bad as it appears at first
glance. A person's self-interested quest for favorable evidence has an
upside that cannot be ignored. Evidence generated by self-interested
parties does not merely help them prove their case in court, but also
helps judges and juries resolve conflicts more accurately and expe-
diently. As we will show, in some cases - such as accidents - the
beneficial effect of evidence-generating endeavors on court proceedings
may outweigh their distortionary effect on primary behavior. In other
instances - such as defensive medicine - the distortion of primary
behavior is so costly that the improvement in judicial accuracy will fall
short of offsetting that cost.
To fully understand the welfare effects of evidence-generating ac-
tivities, one needs to return to the classic work of Judge Calabresi in
the area of tort law. In his seminal book, The Costs of Accidents, Cal-
89 NanoPharma might argue that MegaPharma behaved inequitably, but it will probably not
be able to procure evidence sufficient to prove this accusation. Moreover, this accusation would
fail on the merits because MegaPharma did nothing inequitable. See Pharmacia Corp. v. Par
Pharm., Inc., 417 F.3 d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[Ijnequitable conduct includes affirmative
misrepresentation of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of
false material information, coupled with an intent to deceive." (alteration in original) (quoting Mo-
lins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1,72, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
cf Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
2083, 2125-32 (2009) (advising courts to use the information-cost theory in applying eBay and to
treat an infringer's detrimental reliance on the owner's failure to assert her ownership as a reason
for not issuing an intellectual property injunction).
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abresi famously distinguished among three types of social cost: "prima-
ry costs" that aggregate the cost of accidents and accident-avoidance
expenses, 90 "secondary costs" that represent the distributional effects of
the primary costs upon those who bear those costs under applicable le-
gal rules,91 and "tertiary costs" that encompass the costs of adjudicat-
ing disputes over the allocation of primary and secondary costs.9 In
his framework, an economically minded lawmaker must set up rules
that minimize the total sum of costs - not only the primary costs of
accidents, but also the secondary and tertiary costs.93 Calabresi openly
admitted that this goal is easier to formulate than to accomplish, but
the lawmaker has no better option. 94
Although Calabresi focused on accidents, 95 his framework applies
to all potentially harmful activities.9 6 The primary costs consist of the
costs of harm and the harm-prevention expenses; the secondary costs
comprise the welfare effects of the rules that allocate the costs of al-
ready-inflicted harm; and the tertiary costs are the expenditures asso-
ciated with the legal proceedings necessary to identify the bearers of
the primary and the secondary costs.
Subsequent theorists have extensively analyzed Calabresi's primary
and secondary costs.97 Much less attention has been given to tertiary
costs, perhaps because of their place in Calabresi's hierarchy Howev-
er, Calabresi himself underscored the significance of tertiary costs, ex-
plaining that he called them "tertiary" for a purely technical reason:
they pay for the measures aimed at reducing primary and secondary
costs.98 Making those measures cost-effective is of paramount impor-
tance to the legal system. This overarching efficiency goal, explained
Calabresi, "in a very real sense . . . comes first" because "[i]t tells us to
question constantly whether an attempt to reduce accident costs, either
90 CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 26-2 7.
91 Id. at 27-28.
92 Id. at 28.
93 Id. at 26-31.
94 As Calabresi observed:
[Ais soon as we abandon the hope of having a perfect world in which accident costs
could be so particularized that general deterrence could infallibly price the acts or activi-
ties causing accidents out of the market, or specific deterrence could prohibit them with
complete success, we necessarily move into a world where mixed approaches will pre-
vail. The all-important question that remains, however, is which mixture accomplishes
our mixed aims, not perfectly - as that is impossible - but best.
Id. at 234-35.
95 Id. at 3-16.
96 For one example of how Calabresi's theory has been applied beyond the realm of accident
costs, see Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 373-75 (2009).
97 See, e.g., Symposium, Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents: A Generation of Impact on Law
and Scholarship, 64 MD. L. REV. I, 1-754 (2005).
98 CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 28.
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by reducing accidents themselves or by reducing their secondary ef-
fects, costs more than it saves."99
The addition of tertiary costs to our analysis suggests that evi-
dence-generating activities may not be as socially harmful as they ap-
pear at first sight. To see why, return to our introductory example that
involves an encounter between Andy's and Bob's cars. Assume that
Andy swerves into the ditch to avoid collision and subsequently sues
Bob for the $ooo damage to his car. Bob will deny any responsibility
for Andy's damage and claim that he did not enter Andy's lane or
jeopardize him in any other way. Bob's denial makes the court's fact-
finding task complicated, uncertain, and above all, expensive. In fact,
if Andy cannot produce reliable witnesses to support his case, it is like-
ly that the court will rule in Bob's favor, notwithstanding his responsi-
bility for Andy's damage.
By contrast, in our original scenario in which Andy allows Bob's
car to collide with his, the court will have no difficulty finding Bob re-
sponsible for the accident. Indeed, the collision setup makes the
court's job so straightforward that Bob would hardly want to expend
time and money on litigating the case. Instead, his optimal response
would be to admit responsibility and offer Andy a suitable settlement.
Consequently, the legal system (and society at large) will be spared the
cost of resolving the dispute between Andy and Bob. Even if Bob de-
cides to litigate for some reason, a judge or a jury will have no prob-
lem establishing Bob's liability and will do so at a very low cost.
Admittedly, the savings in adjudicative expenses come at a price:
the occurrence of an avoidable collision. Andy's decision to allow the
collision produced an unnecessary loss of $7000 (consisting of the
$3000 damage to Andy's car and the $4000 damage to Bob's car). If
Andy were to swerve to the ditch, he could save society $6000 in car-
related damages, but given the beneficial effect of the collision on fact-
finding, would swerving be the socially optimal response in this case?
Probably not. The difference in litigation costs in the two scenar-
ios - swerving to the ditch on the one hand and allowing the collision
on the other hand - will likely be well above $6ooo. If so, Andy's ill-
motivated choice to allow the collision would be welfare-enhancing af-
ter all. Counterintuitively, perhaps, if society could somehow force
Andy to swerve into the ditch, Andy's subsequent inability to sue Bob
successfully would lead to an unfair and inefficient result. Devising a
legal rule that would force Andy to minimize the harm from the acci-
dent would sacrifice not only Andy's right to receive legal redress, but
also society's interest in deterring Bob and other negligent drivers. As
a society, we would not want to let drivers like Bob go scot-free. In-
99 Id.
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deed, we have strong efficiency and justice'00 reasons to allow Andy -
and perhaps even to encourage him - to secure the strongest possible
evidence against Bob.
Economic evaluation of evidence-generating activities must thus
consider not only the distortion of the actor's primary behavior, but al-
so the savings in court proceedings. It should be emphasized, however,
that the savings from improved adjudicative proceedings will not al-
ways suffice to offset the waste on the primary behavior level. Indeed,
in some instances, the distortionary effect of evidence-generating con-
duct is so pervasive that it dwarfs the conduct's benefit for judges and
juries.
Consider the case of defensive medicine. Measures adopted by
hospitals and individual doctors in order to fend off potential lawsuits
from patients are wide-ranging and extremely costly. They include
unnecessary diagnostic procedures, hospitalizations and referrals to
specialty doctors, needless gathering of laboratory information, and
even prescriptions for unneeded medications. 01  Some physicians
adopt these measures because of extreme risk aversion.102 This atti-
tude prompts them to address every possible risk for the patient, no
matter how small it is.03 Many other doctors, however, overtreat their
patients for a different reason: they wish to generate evidence that will
help them fend off liability should a malpractice suit be filed against
them. 04 The social cost of defensive medicine is very high, with some
studies estimating it in the tens of billions of dollars. 0 s
100 See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 L. & PHIL. 37, 38
(1983) (explaining corrective justice as a system that "considers the position of the parties anterior
to the transaction as equal, and .. . restores this antecedent equality by transferring resources
from [the wrongdoer] to [the victim] so that the gain realized by the former is used to make up the
loss suffered by the latter").
101 David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a
Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005). This article perceptively identi-
fies those procedures as "assurance behavior" - a concept capturing the procedures' primary
goal: to generate evidence that will defeat future suits for medical malpractice. Id. at 26Io.
102 See, e.g., James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV.
1641, 1644-45 (2008).
103 Id.
104 Professor James Gibson identifies the "doctrinal feedback" dynamic: overcautious doctors
take excessive precautions against risk of suit and cyclically transform those precautions into le-
gally binding customs. Id. at 1653-61.
105 Empirical studies estimate the overall cost of defensive medicine to be somewhere between
$ioo billion and $124 billion per annum across the United States. MASS. MED. SOC'Y, INVES-
TIGATION OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN MASSACHUSETTS I (Nov. 2008), http://www.
massmed.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=ResearchReportsandStudies2&TEMPLATE=/CM/C
ontentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=27797 (noting that defensive medicine imposes over $1.5 bil-
lion in unnecessary medical expenses upon Massachusetts alone); see also Daniel Kessler & Mark
McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, iii Q.J. ECON. 353, 372-85 (1996) (provid-
ing empirical evidence of defensive medicine and its high cost: reduced expenditures on heart-
disease prevention in states capping malpractice damages); Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan,
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The beneficial effect of those procedures on courts' decisions may
be rather insignificant. Courts adjudicating medical malpractice suits
can rely on expert witnesses and independent evidence. The addition-
al evidence generated by hospitals and doctors through defensive prac-
tices may therefore have only a marginal effect on the accuracy of
court decisions. Worse yet, there is reason to suspect that in many in-
stances such evidence may lead courts astray since it is systematically
slanted in favor of defendants.
In other areas, the overall effect of evidence-generating activities on
social welfare is difficult to assess in the abstract. Take the case of in-
tellectual property. The requirement of "continual infringement" cer-
tainly helps courts distinguish between different types of infringers and
enables them to treat each infringer type differently. But does this
mean that the overall effect of evidence-generating conduct in this con-
text is positive? Not necessarily. The answer depends on how long in-
tellectual property owners allow infringing activities to continue before
they take legal action. Or, to put it more accurately, it depends on the
amount of resources the infringer wasted until the infringement suit
was finally brought. As we explained, intellectual property owners
have an incentive to delay suit to pile up evidence of continual in-
fringement that secures injunctive relief. To obtain such evidence,
owners will let the infringers incur unnecessarily high costs.10 6 This
behavior is obviously a concern. In principle, courts can deter intellec-
tual property owners from delaying suit for too long by using the doc-
trines of laches and estoppel to bar recovery. In practice, however,
courts rarely resort to laches, 0 while the estoppel doctrine does not
penalize rights holders for delaying suit.108
Malpractice Law and Health Care Reform: Optimal Liability Policy in an Era of Managed Care,
84 J. PUB. ECON. 175, 178-79, 194-96 (2oo2) (providing updated empirical data confirming the
1996 Kessler & McClellan study).
106 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., Reno Air Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3 d 1126, 1138 (9 th Cir. 2006)
("Laches bars trademark infringement claims 'only where the trademark holder knowingly al-
lowed the infringing mark to be used without objection for a lengthy period of time."' (quoting
Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F 3d 1036, io6i (9th Cir. 1999))); see
also id. at I 139 (attesting that courts proceed on a strong presumption that laches is inapplicable
and that "[iut is extremely rare for laches to be effectively invoked when a plaintiff has filed his
action before limitations in an analogous action at law has run" (quoting Shouse v. Pierce Cnty.,
559 F.2d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
108 See Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (reaffirming the well-settled rule that a patent infringer relying on the equitable estop-
pel defense must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: "(i) The [patentee], who
usually must have knowledge of the true facts, communicate[d] something in a misleading way,
either by words, conduct or silence. (2) The [accused infringer] relie[d] upon that communication.
(3) And the [accused infringer] would be harmed materially if the [patentee] is later permitted to
assert any claim inconsistent with his earlier conduct." (first, third, fifth, and sixth alterations in
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Our analysis of the welfare effect of evidence-generating strategies
employed by law enforcement agents closely tracks our discussion of
intellectual property law. Here too, the social cost of evidence-
generating behavior depends on how far the police let a criminal per-
petrator progress until they ultimately stop him. Yet, there are two
important differences between the two areas. Unlike intellectual prop-
erty owners, police have no inherent reason to delay their action in or-
der to accumulate harm or let the wrongdoing repeat itself. They are
therefore likely to act upon "probable cause," especially when they be-
lieve that they will gather enough evidence to support conviction. On
the other hand, as agents acting to prevent harm to other persons
rather than to themselves, police also have no inherent reason to rush.
There may be cases in which they will let the criminal perpetrator con-
tinue in order to obtain ironclad evidence that will streamline their in-
vestigation and secure the perpetrator's conviction in court. This
strategy engenders serious harm to society and the victim. Hence, it is
difficult to say in the abstract whether the improvement in accuracy is
greater than the harm.
At the end of the day, a full and accurate assessment of the welfare
effect of evidence-generating endeavors would require one to compile a
comprehensive list of the legal settings in which evidentiary motiva-
tions distort primary behavior, estimate the cost of those distortions,
and then compare this cost with the positive effect of the additional
evidence on judicial processes in terms of both accuracy and expe-
dience. Naturally, such an examination lies beyond the ken of this Es-
say. Carrying it out would necessitate massive empirical research. To
date, there are no empirical data on the question, which is not surpris-
ing given the fact that the question has not been discussed in the theo-
retical literature. As theorists, we do not presume to offer a decisive
answer to the social welfare question. Given the dearth - or, more
precisely, complete absence - of empirical data, we can only point to
what we believe the effect of evidence-generating behavior will be in
the context of the examples we discuss. We hope that future research
will bring empirical evidence to bear on the welfare question and eval-
uate the effects of evidence-generating behavior in other settings.
CONCLUSION
When evaluated separately, substantive and evidentiary rules make
perfect economic sense. Substantive rules are the instruments by
which the legal system tries to minimize the cost of harm and the
harm-avoidance expenses as a total sum. Evidentiary rules are the
original) (quoting A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 96o F.2d 1020, 1041 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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system's tools for achieving accurate and expedient implementation of
the substantive rules. 09 The two tools work in harmony when the
system uses them in adjudicating allegations that a substantive rule
was violated.
This ex post vision of evidentiary rules represents conventional
wisdom, which fails to account for the rules' ex ante effects. To com-
ply with the evidentiary requirements for winning a case, an actor
needs evidence that satisfies the requisite substantive and evidentiary
conditions. The actor consequently has a strong incentive to generate
evidence that can help her win her case in court. As we have shown,
this evidentiary motivation will often shape the actor's primary behav-
ior. Instead of trying to avoid or minimize harm in the most cost-
efficient way, actors will behave in a socially wasteful manner when
doing so generates favorable evidence for them. Minimization of harm
and evidence gathering are not overlapping endeavors. Often, these
endeavors will conflict with one another. When they do, an actor's de-
sire to obtain favorable evidence will produce two conflicting effects
on social welfare. On the one hand, it will distort primary behavior
and lead to waste of resources. On the other hand, it will shorten the
duration of trial and might improve the accuracy of adjudicative deci-
sions. We have shown that in some contexts, such as defensive medi-
cine, the first effect will likely dominate, while in others, such as acci-
dents, the second effect will likely be stronger. In still other contexts,
such as nuisance, intellectual property, and criminal law, the net effect
cannot be determined in the abstract and would require a case-by-case
analysis.
We would like to conclude by emphasizing one general point: any
analysis of primary behavior that aspires to have policy implications
must take full account of evidentiary considerations - both at the ac-
tors' and the courts' levels. From this perspective, law and science
share a commonality: the concept and the ever-present contingency of
"proof" is a critical element in both areas. A complete understanding
of legal mechanisms and their function cannot be achieved without in-
tegrating this element. Normative analyses of the law that overlook
evidentiary requirements and incentives will invariably be incomplete
and slanted.
109 See STEIN, supra note 9, at 1-4, 12, 141-43.
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